The Ohio Supreme Court is Asked to "Look Again" at its Decision in State v Bodyke

6-15-2010 Ohio:

The State and the Ohio Attorney General ask the high court to look again at its decision in State v Bodyke, because it seems to contain ambiguities.

In the original decision the court held that, it was a violation of the Separations of Powers clause of the Ohio constitution for the Attorney General to reclassify offenders (registrants, they are no longer offenders) who once were classified by judicial decision.

However, the decision seems to have missed that there are different groups of registrants: A) Those who -earlier in time- were classified by judicial decision, and, B) Those who were not previously classified by judicial decision.

While there is no doubt that the "Separations of Powers" ruling applies to registrants in group "A," there is still a question as to group "B."

Originally Ohio enacted TWO statutes to authorize the reclassification, and the court invalidated both of them, but that is the problem. The court was thinking all 26,000 registrants were once judicially classified, but that was not true of group "B."

So, the essence of the question yet to be answered is, are the TWO statutes which authorize the Ohio AG to classify registrants according to the SORNA scheme in the Adam Walsh Act, invalid (or unconstitutional in some way) as they are applied to group "B" registrants?

Now we wait to hear the court's answer!

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The motion begins like this:

In accordance with Supreme Court Practice Rules 11.2 and 14.4, the State of Ohio and the Ohio Attorney General respectfully move this Court for clarification of its June 3; 2010 decision in State v. Bodyke, 2010 Ohio Lexis 1271, 2010-Ohio-2424.

Neither the State nor the Attorney General is asking the Court to reverse its holding that two provisions in the Ohio Adam Walsh Act ("the Walsh Act"), which required the Attorney General to reclassify sex offenders who had been judicially classified under the old Megan's Law, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61. Rather, the State and the Attorney General seek clarification of the Court's remedy-specifically, whether the Court facially invalidated R.C. 2950.031 and R.C. 2950.032, and thereby struck the provisions entirely, or whether the Court only invalidated those provisions as applied to sex offenders who had been judicially classified under Megan's Law.

The Attorney General's Office is moving quickly to update the State's sex-offender registry (e-SORN) to comply with the Bodyke decision. For offenders who received Megan's Law classifications by court order before the effective date of the Walsh Act, the Office will update e-SORN to reflect the original Megan's Law classifications and notify these offenders of the reclassification. Absent clarification from this Court, however, the Attorney General does not know what classifications to input for a significant segment of sex offenders who did not receive a Megan's Law classification by court order.

All parties-the State and the offenders themselves-will benefit from clarification. Such a pronouncement will ensure that the Attorney General, the county prosecutors, and the county sheriffs properly implement the Court's directive; it will provide clear notice to individual offenders as to which framework-Megan's Law or the Walsh Act-applies to them; and it will accord the Bodyke decision the finality this Court intended. For the remainder of the motion.

eAdvocate