6-13-2008 Montana:
A federal judge in Missoula this week ruled that a provision of the national Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act is unconstitutional and dismissed a felony indictment accusing one sex offender of failing to register in Montana.
In a 44-page opinion issued Wednesday, U.S. District Judge Donald W. Molloy ruled that Congress cannot federally criminalize a sex offender's failure to register in a state-run database. Congress therefore exceeded its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause by making it a federal crime for a sex offender to travel to another state and fail to re-register in that jurisdiction, Molloy wrote.
Jessica T. Fehr, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Montana, said the government intends to appeal the decision to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
"The U.S. Attorney's Office will be recommending to the Office of the Solicitor General that we do appeal Judge Molloy's decision," Fehr said Friday. The U.S. Attorney's Office must receive authorization from the solicitor general before appealing a decision.
According to Molloy's order, no other appellate court has ruled on the issue, and his decision could potentially clear the way for other similar indictments to be dismissed on the same grounds.
"If the factual scenario fits in other cases, we will try to get those cases dismissed," said Tony Gallagher, executive director of the Federal Defenders of Montana. "It's a big decision and it's a highly tactical point. We went after the indictment full bore with three motions to dismiss. We raised everything we possibly could, and Judge Molloy ruled that Congress went beyond its authority under the Commerce Clause in this particular scenario."
The scenario at hand involves Bernard L. Waybright, 58, who in May 2004 was convicted of a misdemeanor sex crime in a West Virginia state court. As part of his sentence, he was required to register under the federal Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, which keeps track of where sex offenders reside. He then traveled to Montana on several occasions, but did not re-register with local law enforcement authorities, as required by federal law.
In his order, Molloy dismissed the indictment without prejudice, ruling that the provision "would allow Congress to federalize nearly any local criminal offense simply by making it a crime for someone who committed the offense to travel in interstate commerce at some point in his life."
Because Molloy dismissed the indictment "without prejudice," federal prosecutors can re-allege the charges against Waybright if they find another legal hook to do so.
Federal defender John Rhodes of Missoula filed the motions to dismiss the indictment, asserting seven different legal grounds that he argued during a hearing earlier this month.
Molloy denied a majority of those arguments, but ruled in favor of Rhodes' assertion that Congress overreached its authority and violated the Interstate Commerce Clause.
"It is evident that the same or similar arguments have been raised in district courts around the country," Molloy wrote in his opinion. "These courts have mostly rejected such challenges for varying reasons. In my view, those district courts have it right for the most part. I conclude that all of Waybright's arguments, except one, lack merit."
The exception is Waybright's claim that enactment of a particular provision requiring all sex offenders to register, regardless of whether they travel in interstate commerce, is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under the U.S. Constitution. Molloy therefore declared the provision unconstitutional. ..Source.. TRISTAN SCOTT
May 8, 2010
Molloy: Sex offender registry rule unconstitutional
April 10, 2010
Sex Offenders More Dangerous When They're Homeless: A FALSE BELIEF
A recent study "Failure to Register as a Sex Offender: Is it Associated with Recidivism?" proved that, unregistered sex offfenders are no more dangerous or likely to recidivate than their registered counterparts. And an earlier study in Minnesota: "The Effects of Failure to Register on Sex Offender Recidivism" held similar results. Accordingly we have another myth perpetratred by false personal beliefs!4-10-2010 National:
Jessica's Law, first passed in Florida in 2005 as a way to protect children from sex offenders, actually puts kids more at risk. Since Jessica's Law (Proposition 83) was passed in California in late 2006, for example, the number of homeless sex offenders skyrocketed from 88 to 2,300, all in the name of increased safety, especially for our children. This is because Jessica's Law restricts sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or a park. In cramped urban areas, however, finding housing outside of these parameters is nearly impossible, so where are they supposed to live?
The silliest part is that Jessica's Law doesn't restrict sex offenders from hanging out in parks and near schools all day long. They just can't sleep nearby. Shouldn't folks be more concerned with what a sex offender does while awake than asleep? California lawmakers are catching on, pushing Chelsea's Law, which would regulate where sex offenders can and cannot go during the day.
A person's living situation does inform where he commits crime, but in a different way than Jessica's Law assumes. Sex offenders are at increased risk for committing another sex offense if they are homeless. As we all know by now, the instability of homelessness and associated turmoil can exacerbate mental health conditions or trigger new ones. It's no different for sex offenders released from prison and sent to the streets with nothing to help focus their energy into positive behavioral change.
As to trigerring new offenses, yes, but it is not new sex offenses. People under stress and unable to meet their basic needs, will resort to any means -often criminal- to meet these needs. These needs are food shelter medical and other such needs, these take money to pay for them, and crimes such as theft are more likely than another sex offense. Politicians tout a sex offender's need is only sex, but politican's fail to recognize the human side of man!
Some argue, however, that sex offenders really don't change. So, how do we deal with this issue? Suggestion and practice has varied from castration to more consistent supervision to mental health treatment, but really, the verdict is still out (although, castration seems a bit inhumane and extreme if you ask me). It's important to remember, however, that not all sex offenders are the same and that cases should be considered individually. We need to pause and think more clearly about the issue instead of letting fear drag us down a blinding rabbit hole that actually makes the problem worse.
This reminds me of the outraged and irrational Venice Beach residents who bully their homeless, disgusted by their existence, fearful that the homeless will hurt them and their children. Granted, parents have every right to want to protect their children from sexual assault, but it seems that our culture of fear, reactivity and a lack of thinking things through informs our laws — laws that don't work and put our children, our elders, and the rest of us, at greater risk.
Nationwide, Jessica's Laws exist to offer us a sense of safety, instead of true safety. This delusion offers us a false sense of control over our lives. Consider the facade of "national security," and even more relevant, the shooing away of the homeless to give the illusion of solving the homelessness problem.
Homeless sex offenders are faced with even more meager housing options than other people experiencing homelessness. Few want to hire them or willingly live among them. For their well being and the community's, sex offenders need to be housed. Tell your representatives to review your state's current sex offender laws to make them more humane and effective, instead of making Jessica's Law stricter. Remember, sex offenders are people too, and if that's not something that necessarily grips you, be warned that Jessica's Law causes homelessness, which puts sex offenders, perhaps even the best intentioned ones, at increased risk of relapse. We should all care what happens to homeless sex offenders, one way or the other. ..Source.. Story by Jessica Rowshandel, Photo credit: Bob Jagendorf
November 20, 2009
Loophole in PA's Megan's Law
8-20-2009 Pennsylvania:
Some sex offenders “will fall through the cracks and escape Megan’s Law” unless Pennsylvania lawmakers re-write the statute to include homeless transients, Pennsylvania’s Superior Court says.
Pennsylvania requires a Megan’s Law offender _ those who have been convicted of a wide range of sexual crimes – to register his “residence” with the local police. But what happens when an offender is a homeless man who has no residence, when he literally lives on the streets?
The court has held there is nothing in the law that requires a homeless person to register.
A man named William Wilgus was freed from prison in April 2007, after serving time for aggravated indecent assault, a second-degree felony. Mr. Wilgus was charged by police with violating Megan’s Law after he lived on the streets of downtown Harrisburg for 30 days but failed to register and verify his current or intended residence.
The court record shows that upon his release from prison, Mr. Wilgus first tried to live in a homeless shelter in Harrisburg called Bethesda Mission. But two days after he arrived, he learned of the Mission’s policy against housing Megan’s Law registrants. There was no space at the Salvation Army; no vacancies at the YMCA. He arranged to obtain a locker at a soup kitchen called the Daily Bread, and used that address to receive social security benefits.
The court looked to the legal definition of residence in Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law: a “location where an individual resides or is domiciled or intends to be domiciled for 30 consecutive days or more during a calendar year.” Mr. Wilgus lived in the Second and Market Streets area of Harrisburg, staying in alleyways by a courthouse and by a hospital, or on benches in parks and at bus stops, the court said.
The locker and mailbox at the soup kitchen did not qualify as a residence because Mr. Wilgus did not maintain an abode there, the court concluded, adding that a homeless person such as Mr. Wilgus “will never acquire a fixed abode within a permanent neighborhood.”
So, although Megan’s Law was designed to provide communities with notification when sexually violent predators live in or near their neighborhoods, the law is defective to the extent that homeless transients no longer need worry about registering. The Pennsylvania Legislature may well consider amending the state statute to address the status of homeless offenders within the meaning of Megan’s Law, the court said. ..Source.. Robert L. Sharpe of the Prince Law Offices
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com
Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com
June 26, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANT
v.
WILLIAM HOWARD WILGUS, APPELLEE
Appeal from the Order entered May 27, 2008 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No. CP-22-CR-0002439-2007.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cleland, J.
BEFORE: ALLEN, CLELAND AND FITZGERALD*fn1 , JJ.
OPINION
¶ 1 We are called on to decide whether the Legislature, in requiring a Megan's Law offender to register his "residence," included within the requirement the circumstances of this case in which the defendant is a homeless and transient person.
¶ 2 The defendant William Howard Wilgus (Wilgus) was released from prison and, after being turned away from various housing programs, lived on the streets of downtown Harrisburg for 30 days before being arrested for not registering his "residence" as required by Megan's Law. He was convicted in a non-jury trial, but the trial judge set aside his conviction and dismissed the charges. The trial judge concluded Wilgus did not have a "residence" to register and, therefore, had not violated Megan's Law.
¶ 3 We conclude the Legislature could have drafted the Megan's Law registration requirement to require a homeless and transient person to register, but it did not, and, consequently, we agree the conviction must be set aside.
¶ 4 The trial court granted Wilgus an arrest of judgment of his conviction for failure to comply with the registration requirements under Pennsylvania's Megan's Law*fn2 requiring him to inform the Pennsylvania State Police of his current, intended or change in residence.*fn3 The Commonwealth appealed.
¶ 5 This is a case of first impression in which, to assess the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence, we must first determine the meaning of the word "residence" as intended by the Legislature and then resolve whether a person without a fixed place of habitation or abode has acquired or can acquire a "residence" such that he must register it under the Megan's Law.
¶ 6 On March 14, 1998, following Wilgus's conviction of aggravated indecent assault, a second-degree felony,*fn4 the trial court sentenced Wilgus to five years' to life incarceration, found him to be a sexually violent predator, and ordered him to comply with the Megan's Law registration requirements. Trial Court Order, 3/14/98, at 1--2. On November 4, 1998, this Court vacated the sentence and remanded for sentencing without application of the Megan's Law registration requirements. Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 734 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. 1998). On January 29, 1999, the trial court re-sentenced Wilgus to 5 years' to 10 years' incarceration. On April 23, 2007, Wilgus was released from prison, but since he was incarcerated at the time the 2000 revisions to Megan's Law became effective, he had to comply with the registration requirements. See §§ 9795.1 and 9795.2. On May 20, 2007, the State Police arrested and charged him with failure during the period since release to register his current or new residence address, to verify his address, and to provide accurate information.*fn5 On January 18, 2008, the trial court, sitting without a jury, found Wilgus guilty of the first two charges but acquitted on the third. On May 27, 2008, however, the trial court granted Wilgus's post-trial motion for arrest of judgment and dismissed the charges against him. Trial Court Order, 5/27/08, at 1.
¶ 7 The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal raising a question of first impression: Whether the trial court erred in granting the post-trial motion for an arrest of judgment on the ground the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of a homeless person for failing to register and verify his current or intended residences.
¶ 8 When released from prison on April 23, a friend drove Wilgus to the Bethesda Mission, a homeless shelter in Harrisburg. He remained there from his late afternoon arrival until departing the morning of April 25 after he was informed of the Mission's policy against housing Megan's Law registrants. N.T. Trial, 1/23/08, at 12, 21. Wilgus next went to 1708 Market St., in Harrisburg, which is the address he had registered before his parole. Id. at 12. Because there were no apartments at this location, Wilgus next tried to find housing at a Salvation Army shelter for drug and alcohol addicts but there was no space available. Id. at 12-13. He then tried the Daily Bread, a soup kitchen in the Boyd Building of The Pine Street Presbyterian Church, Harrisburg, but with no success. Id. at 13-14. He also tried a YMCA but there were no vacancies. Id. at 15. With only $50.00 in his pocket and believing he had nowhere else to go, Wilgus settled into a homeless existence in the Second and Market Street areas of Harrisburg, staying in alleyways by the courthouse and by a hospital, on benches, and the like. Id. at 16, 13. He never stayed in one place for more than 20 hours at a time. Id. at 16. He arranged to obtain a locker and to receive his mail at the Daily Bread; he also listed the Daily Bread as his mailing address to receive social security benefits. Id. at 13. Finally, four weeks later, on May 20, the State Police arrested him.
¶ 9 The standard of review is:
In reviewing an appeal from a trial court's granting of motion in arrest of judgment, we must determine whether the evidence offered by the Commonwealth was legally sufficient to support the verdict. To reach this determination, we accept all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which the fact-finder could have based the verdict; we can affirm the granting of a motion in arrest of judgment if, viewed in that manner, the evidence was nonetheless insufficient in law to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the crimes charged. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 369 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. Super. 1976).
¶ 10 The Commonwealth faces an insurmountable barrier because Megan's Law, as enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature, simply does not cover the situation presented by a homeless person without a fixed place of habitation of some degree of permanence. "Residence" is defined in the statute as "[a] location where an individual resides or is domiciled or intends to be domiciled for 30 consecutive days or more during a calendar year." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792.
¶ 11 This case is singularly one of statutory construction that is all too familiar:
[As set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a),] "The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly"[][.] "Generally speaking, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute." "Furthermore, in construing statutory language, '[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage....'" (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903). The Act further provides that, "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); . . . .
Under Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, it is only when the words of a statute "are not explicit" that a court may resort to other considerations, such as the statute's perceived "purpose," in order to ascertain legislative intent. Consistent with the Statutory Construction Act, this Court has repeatedly recognized that rules of construction, such as consideration of a statute's perceived "object" or "purpose," are to be resorted to only when there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the words.
Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 583 Pa. 149, 157-159, 876 A.2d 904, 909 (2005).
¶ 12 Megan's Law is remedial legislation intended to "protect the safety and general welfare of the people." See § 9791(b). Its "registration, notification, and counseling requirements [are] non-punitive" or remedial in character. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 589 Pa. 559, 570, 910 A.2d 10, 17 (2006). The remedial provisions of a statute, unlike its penal provisions, must be construed liberally. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c) ("All other provisions of a statute shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice."). Our Supreme Court has distinguished remedial from penal provisions in the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 - 201-9, when it held: "Section 1928 directs that although penal provisions are to be strictly construed, all others 'shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.' Id. s 1928(c). The legislative emphasis is on provisions, not statutes in their entirety." Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 461, 329 A.2d 812, 817 (1974). The Commonwealth Court followed the Supreme Court in construing the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act, 65 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101 -- 1113 (formerly 65 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 401 -- 409). The issue was whether Pennsylvania Turnpike Commissioners were "public employees" within the meaning of the Ethics Act. The Commonwealth Court stated:
The petitioners contend that the entire Ethics Act must be narrowly construed because it contains penal provisions. While penal provisions of a statute must be strictly construed, other provisions should be liberally construed to effect their objectives and to promote justice. See 1 Pa.C.S. s 1928; Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 495 Pa. 450, 460-61, 329 A.2d 812, 817 (1974).
Camiel v. State Ethics Commission, 425 A.2d 60, 62 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).
¶ 13 Although the Commonwealth argues § 9792's definition of "residence" is a broad definition designed to encompass transient and homeless persons, the argument stretches the common sense definition of "residence" to the breaking point. "Residence" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary in a very traditional sense: "2. The place where one actually lives . . . 3. A house or other fixed abode; a dwelling." Black's Law Dictionary 1335 (8th Ed. 2004). The clear implication is that "residence" is a geographical location inhabited on a more than momentary or fleeting basis. Clearly, the statutory definition in § 9792 contemplates a physical "location" of some degree of permanence -- in short, something akin to a traditional residence, but most definitely not a locale of one day's duration or a mere mailing address as in the instant case.
¶ 14 Section 9792's definition of residence, by equating it to a location of "30 consecutive days or more," recognizes, of course, some degree of permanence is necessary to transform a place of habitat into a "residence."*fn6 That "residence" means a fixed and somewhat permanent location draws additional support from an underlying purpose of Megan's Law which is to afford protection to the public and specifically to a Megan's Law registrant's neighbors. Section 9791(b) states:
(b) Declaration of policy.--It is hereby declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this Commonwealth by providing for registration and community notification regarding sexually violent predators who are about to be released from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood. § 9791(b) (emphasis added). Section 9798(a) requires the police to prepare a written notice containing a Megan's Law registrant's name, address, crime committed, fact of sexually violent predator status, and photo if available. The police must give the written notice to "[n]eighbors of the sexually violent predator." § 9798(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 9798.1(c)(1)(iii) requires that information posted on the Internet about registrants must include "the street address, municipality, county and zip code of all residences." (emphasis added).
¶ 15 These provisions breathe meaning into "residence" as a fixed geographical location within a neighborhood whose residents are entitled to notice and protection. If a homeless person, as in Wilgus's case, drifts from park bench to bus stop to alleyway on a daily basis, he will never acquire a fixed abode within a permanent neighborhood.*fn7
¶ 16 Wilgus never established a fixed and somewhat permanent (even if defined as 30 or more days as set forth in § 9792) "residence." As such, he and others like him will fall through the cracks and escape Megan's Law sanctions until such time as the Legislature amends the statute.*fn8 *fn9
¶ 17 Pennsylvania is not the first state to confront the application of a Megan's Law registration requirement to a homeless person. In Twine v. Maryland, 910 A.2d 1132 (Md. 2006),the Maryland Court of Appeals undertook a similar analysis and reached a result similar to ours. There the defendant, following his eviction from an apartment, became homeless over a five-month period until arrested for failing to register a change of residence. The Maryland statute used "the words 'residence' and 'address' interchangeably," even though, unlike our Pennsylvania statute, it did not attempt a statutory definition of either term. Id. at 1137. The court framed the issue: "The question is one of statutory construction, and the sole question of statutory construction before us is whether [defendant] changed residences when he was evicted from the Sweetgum Circle residence in August of 2004 and became homeless as a result." Id. at 1138.*fn10
¶ 18 The defendant argued "the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, as he 'could not register a change of residence . . . because he had no residence to register.'" Id.at 1136. The Maryland court held:
We hold that appellant did not change residences within the meaning of § 11-705(d) when he became homeless, because he did not acquire a new "residence" within the meaning of the statute. "Residence," as noted above, is used interchangeably with "address" in this statutory scheme. Because the ordinary meanings of "residence" and "address" connote some degree of permanence or intent to return to a place, and appellant was homeless, he had not acquired a residence within the contemplation of the statute. The statute does not address how compliance can be achieved by a person in appellant's circumstances.
Id. at 1138. Further, the Maryland court held:
We conclude, on the basis of the plain meaning of "residence" and "address," that the General Assembly did not intend the notification requirement in § 11-705(d) to apply to "homeless" persons. . . . Given the plain meanings of "residence" and "address," we conclude that a registrant has a "residence" within the meaning of § 11-705(d) only if that person has a fixed location at which the registrant is living, or one to which the registrant intends to return upon leaving it. See . . .Webster's Third New International Dictionary 24-25, 1931 (1963) (defining "address" as "the designation of a place . . . where a person or organization may be found or communicated with," and defining "residence" as "a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit"); Webster's New International Dictionary 2119 (2d ed. 1950) (defining "residence" as the "act or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time").
Id. at 1140.
¶ 19 In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's arrest of judgment on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. Because Wilgus's homeless existence precluded the possibility of a residence, or fixed place of habitation or abode, we are constrained to hold Wilgus was without a "residence" to register, change or verify within the meaning of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law. The Legislature may well consider amending the statute to address the status of homeless offenders within the registration requirements of Megan's Law.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
Opinion Footnotes
*fn1 Former Justice specially assigned to Superior Court.
*fn2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791 -- 9799.9.
*fn3 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.2.
*fn4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a).
*fn5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915(a)(1), (2) and (3), respectively.
*fn6 One would not seriously contend, for example, a hotel is a "residence" of a proverbial traveling salesman because he stays overnight; nor would one contend a parent's home is a "residence" of an adult child visiting over the holidays.
*fn7 The Commonwealth argues the Daily Bread became Wilgus's residence because he maintained a locker and mail pick-up at this location and listed it as his address to receive social security benefits. The argument is without merit for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Wilgus did not maintain a place of abode there.
*fn8 We note the state of Washington amended its statute to require those like Wilgus "who lack a fixed residence, to register and report changes in living situation." Twine v. Maryland, 910 A.2d 1132, 1139 (Md. 2006). The amendment was the Legislature's response to State v. Pickett, 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1999). Twine, 910 A.2d at 1139. The Washington Court of Appeals had held:
The evidence is undisputed that Pickett was living on the streets, sometimes staying in parks in Everett and Seattle, sometimes on the sidewalks of downtown Seattle. Pickett's situation is not contemplated by the statute. Because ... 'residence address' connote[s] some permanence or intent to return to a place, it is impossible for Pickett to comply with the statute as written Pickett, 975 P.2d at 586-587.
*fn9 We caution that not all "homeless persons" will escape registration requirements. There will be those persons, regarded as homeless, but who have temporary abodes, such as the home of a relative or friend or a shelter, and who, therefore, will be expected to register.
*fn10 As in Wilgus's case, the defendant in Twine also challenged the Maryland statute "as unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless persons because in the absence of a statutory definition of 'residence,' the sex offender registration statute 'does not provide clear notice to a person who becomes homeless on how to comply with'" the registration requirement. Id. at 1136, n.3. Vacating the conviction on insufficiency of evidence grounds, the Maryland court declined to reach the constitutional issue. In Wilgus's case, we also find it unnecessary to reach the same constitutional issue.
August 29, 2009
FL- Former Skynyrd drummer acquitted
See earlier story: Guess jury decide that "The law is an ass" due to fact complications that simply were never allowed for in the laws.
8-29-2009 Florida:
Former Lynyrd Skynyrd drummer Artimus Pyle was acquitted Friday of failing to register as a sex offender and lying on a driver’s license application.
Jurors deliberated four hours after a five-day trial before delivering their verdict, ending the 61-year-old rocker’s latest legal ordeal.
Pyle hugged and kissed his lawyers and numerous friends and family who showed up to support him.
“I feel very blessed,” he said. “I was in the hands of six people that really paid attention.”
He said waiting for the verdict was in some ways more stressful than the aftermath of the 1977 plane crash that killed three band members, the road manager and two pilots.
“I have never felt a feeling in my life like the feeling of waiting for that verdict,” he said. “It’s a feeling so deep inside you. It’s so hollow, and you feel so helpless.”
Pyle said the acquittal now frees him up to ask the governor to set aside his 1993 guilty pleas to attempted capital sexual battery and lewd assault charges on two young girls in Jacksonville Beach. He will have plenty of supporters in that effort, including one of the girls, his now-20-year-old daughter Kelly, who said Friday she believes the crime never happened.
Kelly Pyle was in court for much of the trial to support her father, who she didn’t meet until she was 18. She said she has never believed her father sexually assaulted her or any other child.
“If those charges were true, I wouldn’t be here supporting my dad,” she said. “I love him, and I know that he is a good person.”
She said he pleaded guilty because the state offered him probation and he was facing a potential of 25 years to life in prison.
In closing arguments Thursday, Assistant State Attorney Kelly Wark confessed a love for Lynyrd Skynyrd’s music but urged jurors not to be swayed by “sympathy or sadness at the tainting of an American legend.”
She said the law is clear that he should have registered as a sex offender because he worked and stayed in Florida. After he was arrested for that she said he failed to provide a correct address, resulting in a second arrest a week later. Wark said he clearly violated the law by swearing to Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles workers that his old St. Johns County address was still correct.
“He is not above the law,” she said. “He made choice after choice after choice with the assistance of everyone who loves him to violate the rules.”
Wark said Pyle had no problem following the rules during his eight-year probation sentence.
But defense attorney Craig Williams insisted Pyle no longer lived in Florida and therefore wasn’t required to register in the state. The only reason he came to Florida in November 2007 was to reinstate his driver’s license after a series of mistakes by the St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office and the Florida Department of Revenue, Williams said.
He called the circumstances of Pyle’s arrest a “paperwork nightmare” and “mountain of calamity.”
He said St. Johns deputies never consulted the Florida Department of Law Enforcement Internet site, which would have shown Pyle with a North Carolina address. They lost a document showing Pyle notified the department when he moved from Crescent Beach in 2002, only to find it again two months ago, Williams said. And they ignored repeated phone calls from Williams’ office the week of Pyle’s arrest that he said could have resolved the matter.
If Pyle had resided at his old Florida address, Williams argued, he would have lived there free of charge without the knowledge of the family living there now for five years. He noted that when he learned St. Johns deputies were looking for him in 2007, he immediately called one of them, got in his car and drove to Florida the next day.
“Mr. Pyle doesn’t think he’s above the rules. In fact, Mr. Pyle did everything in his power to comply with the rules,” Williams said. “When people explained to him what he was required to do, he did it.” ..Source.. by Paul Pinkham
August 28, 2009
FL- Skynyrd drummer testifies in his defense in sex offender case
See earlier report: There are two ways to view this case: 1) He's guilty, guilty, guilty; -OR- 2) The law is an ass, simply because life presents circumstances for which lawmakers are not capable of foreseeing and refuse to make allowances for within the law. Life changes as one gets older, a person's ability to reason changes too, here this man has a firm to handle finances because he recognizes life is changing him. He complies with the spirit of the law, but will likely be found guilty because of the way the law is worded (fault of lawmakers).
8-28-2009 Florida:
Pyle is charged with two counts of failing to register as an offender.
ST. AUGUSTINE - Former Lynyrd Skynyrd drummer Artimus Pyle told a jury Thursday he never meant to violate Florida's sex offender registry law and the charges against him resulted from a "convoluted" series of mixups.
"I was just trying to get my [driver's] license," Pyle testified. "I'm a long-haired, hippie freak ... but when somebody in authority tells me something, I try to listen and comply."
He told jurors: "I'm more nervous now than when we opened up for the Stones."
Pyle, 61, is charged with two counts of failing to register as a sex offender and one count of giving false information on a driver's license application. All are third-degree felonies carrying a maximum five-year prison sentence.
He pleaded guilty in 1993 to two counts of lewd and lascivious assault in Jacksonville Beach.
Prosecutors contend Pyle moved back to Florida in 2007 and didn't register within 48 hours as required by law. They note he gave his old Crescent Beach address when applying to reinstate his driver's license.
But Pyle, who has a home in North Carolina and is living with a friend in Virginia, said he doesn't live in Florida and hasn't in years.
He said he drove to Florida to reinstate his license after receiving a letter from the Department of Revenue. He said the department canceled it after mistakenly thinking he had stopped paying child support. In fact, he testified, his youngest child had turned 18.
Pyle said he used the Crescent Beach address because he planned to use his new Florida license to obtain a license in North Carolina. The old address had been on there for years, and he said he just decided to "let it ride."
"I was wrong," he said. He said he later gave police the Nocatee address of a friend so that police would be able to find him when he stayed there during visits to Florida.
Earlier Thursday, Pyle's lawyers presented three witnesses who testified he is so disorganized and unfocused that people in his life have to help him with details.
Among them was Michael Latimer, a Miami accountant who runs a trust that pays all of Pyle's bills and collects royalties and other income. Latimer testified the trust has total and irrevocable control over Pyle's finances, and he would know if Pyle purchased, rented or maintained property in Florida.
Circuit Judge Wendy Berger said she expects the case to wrap up after closing arguments this morning. ..Source.. by Paul Pinkham
August 5, 2009
RI- Update: Camp Runamuck leader held without bail
This "Failure to Register" case presents some very interesting -and unusual- circumstances: 1) The man had FINISHED his term of registration in Massachusetts before moving to Rhode Island; 2) He moves to RI as a homeless person. It is not illogical for this man to beleieve he DOES NOT have to register based on those facts. So, the question becomes, how does RI sex offender registration law handle DUE PROCESS? i.e., notify him of any duty to register.
The U.S. Supreme court in a SO register case (Lambert -v- California) held, that somehow, a local jurisdiction must notify a person of the duty to register BEFORE arresting him for FAILING to comply with the local law.
Note: There appears to be a problem in the RI Sex Offender Registraion law, while I agree the law seems to require him to register, but, there is nothing in the law notifying him of that duty (remember he has special circumstances).
Given there are those who will contest my interpretation, think of this, if the legislature made a law requring ALL folks to get State IDs, and only stood on the steps pf the legislature and screamed out the law to anyone that was listening, could they then arrest anyone who HAD NOT HEARD that NOTICE? Does that answer the issue!
Never forget, the circumstances of a case determine whether or not this U.S. Sup court case would apply. Lets see how the court handles this case...hopefully the lawyer will present this U.S. Sup court case. Sex offender laws are not common sense laws. i.e., thou shall not murder, or beat up thy neighbor etc. (IT is also true most SO laws make no sense, but thats another issue)
8-5-2009 Rhode Island:
PROVIDENCE, R.I. -- A District Court judge Wednesday sent ____, the leader of an East Providence homeless group, back to jail for violating the terms of his bail.
____, 55, was arrested Friday for failing to register as a level-3 sex offender. A supporter paid his bail on Saturday.
But when ____ failed to notify police of his address or his status as a sex offender, Providence Police arrested him again on Tuesday. "He did not go to the police" the day he left prison or the following Sunday or Monday, said Assistant Attorney General Bethany Macktaz.
When asked by Judge Magistrate Joseph P. Ippolito, Jr. where ____ is staying, Macktaz said, "We don't know where he is living now."
Ippolito ordered ____ to be held without bail at the Adult Correctional Institutions until an Aug. 12 court appearance.
____ was convicted of several sex crimes more than 20 years ago in Massachusetts. His lawyer, Arthur Parise, said he believes _____ is not required to register in Rhode Island. But Macktaz argued that the state law is clear, and that _____ must register with a local police department.
Megan Smith, a spokeswoman for Camp Runamuck, the group living under a bridge in East Providence, said the homeless community supports _____ and is hoping for a "quick and favorable resolution." ..Source.. by Paul Davis, Journal Staff Writer
July 2, 2009
AR- Court: Failing to register as sex offender can’t be punished with restitution
7-2-2009 Arkansas:
LITTLE ROCK — Failing to comply with reporting requirements for sex offenders is not an offense that can be punished with an order of restitution, the state Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday.
The court reversed a Sebastian County circuit judge’s decision to revoke the suspended sentence of Keith Owens, who pleaded no contest in June 2001 to failing to comply with the Sex and Child Offender Registration Act. The circuit judge lacked jurisdiction to revoke the suspension, the appeals court ruled.
Owens was sentenced in 2001 to two years in prison, plus four years suspended. In April 2004, an agreed order was filed stating that Owens agreed to pay overdue child support as part of his suspended sentence and agreed to let the restitution office of the Sebastian County prosecuting attorney’s office collect the payments.
In September 2007, the state filed a petition to revoke Owens’ suspended sentence. Owens’ lawyer argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Owens’ suspended sentence had expired in June 2007.
Prosecutors argued that the court had jurisdiction because Owens still owed a significant amount of back child support and was paying it as restitution. A circuit judge agreed and revoked Owens’ suspended sentence.
In its opinion Wednesday reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals said the offense of which Owens was convicted could not be punished with an order to pay restitution.
Restitution is defined as the act of “making good or giving equivalent value” for “actual economic loss caused to a victim by the offense,” the court said.
“There is no particular victim associated with Owens’ offense of failing to comply with reporting requirements of the Sex and Child Offender Registration Act. … Therefore, there cannot be restitution associated with this offense,” Judge David Glover wrote in the opinion. ..Source.. by John Lyon, Arkansas News Bureau
April 6, 2009
MO- Missouri Supreme Court rejects challenge from sex offender
(Post by eAdvocate) 4-6-2009 Missouri:
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge from a sex offender who incurred a prison sentence when he did not register a change of address notice within 10 days.
The Supreme Court previously ruled that it was unconstitutional to require sex offenders convicted of crimes before Jan. 1, 1995, to register with local law enforcement authorities. Such a move, the court argued, was a retrospective function disallowed allowed under the Missouri Constitution.
A Hannibal resident named William Holden argued that he fell into that category, since the date of his offense was before the law went into effect but the guilty plea came into effect several months after the law became active.
Before he pleaded guilty to committing sodomy on a 5-year-old in March 1995, the state of Missouri enacted a law that, among other things, required individuals registered as sex offenders to notify local sheriff's departments of moving to a new residence within 10 days.
Holden was released from prison in 2001. After his release, Holden registered as a sex offender with the Marion County Sheriff's Department and moved into a basement.
In August 2007, Holden alerted the Marion County Sheriff's Office that he had been living out of his car and that he needed to re-register as a sex offender by the end of the month.
(Posted by eAdvocate)
An official with the sheriff's department told him of the 10-day requirement, and the next day Holden provided a written statement that he had moved residences more than a month before. He was subsequently arrested and eventually sentenced to four years in prison by a trial court.
In a unanimous ruling, the court found that the law did apply to Holden. Writing for the court, Judge William Ray Price Jr. wrote that previous court decisions found the time of the guilty plea -- not the date of purported crime -- triggered the registration requirements.
"In this case, Holden was charged with two counts of sodomy with a child under the age of fourteen years," Price wrote. "When Holden pled guilty to this offense, the registration requirements had been in effect for several months. [The statute] as applied to Holden, is constitutional."
Price also wrote that state did not err in not disclosing a number of Holden's registration forms. The court also rejected arguments that the decision against Holden was prejudiced when his victim's age was relayed in court.
"The victim's age is relevant to prove that Holden was previously convicted of a sexual offense involving a child under the age of fourteen years. ... To the extent that the age is inflammatory, it is the result of defendant's own conduct and does not outweigh its prohibitive effect," Price wrote.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Richard Teitelman wrote that Holden's conviction and sentence "unintentionally may undermine future enforcement efforts."
"Had Mr. Holden realized voluntary re-registration would land him in jail for four years, he would have been faced with a significant incentive to abscond," Teitelman wrote. "If the purpose of the registration requirements is to permit authorities and the public to stay apprise of an offenders' residence, then it may prove unwise to impose harsh punishments on those offenders, like Mr. Holden, who undertake good faith but technically erroneous efforts at compliance." Judge Michael Wolff concurred in Teitelman's opinion.
Irene Karns, the public defender representing Holden, could not be reached for comment. Travis Ford, a spokesman for the attorney general's office, said the effect of the decision is that Holden will remain confined in a Licking, Mo., prison.
The case is State v. Holden, SC89635. (Decision available in the files area of our S_News Group) ..News Source.. by Daily Record and the Kansas City Daily News-Press, Jason Rosenbaum
June 18, 2008
MT- Despite ruling Marshals search unregistered sex offenders
The truth is that the Adam Walsh Act does permit the U.S. Marshal's service to work with local police to find those who do not register. Accordingly, should they find someone then they simply DO NOT charge them in federal court BUT then turn them over to state authorities for state prosecution. Generally, states have different punishment schemes than what is prescribed by AWA. Accordingly, the only provision of AWA that is no good (unconstitutional) is the provision which allows charging someone for FTR after crossing state lines in federal court.
6-18-2008 Montana:
Despite a ruling by a federal judge against a key provision of the national sex offender registration law, U.S. Marshals say they will continue to hunt down sex offenders who fail to register here in Montana.
Last Friday, U.S. District Judge Donald Molloy of Missoula ruled that Congress exceeded its authority when it created the Adam Walsh Act.
That law made it a federal crime for sex offenders to travel to another state and not re-register as a sex offender.
Chief Deputy US Marshal Rod Ostermiller calls the ruling an isolated decision and says Marshals will continue tracking down sex offenders even if it means prosecuting them in state courts.
"We're going to try to minimize any impact that it has on public safety. We're going to continue to investigate these crimes and hopefully it will have a minimal impact because we are not going to let up." said Ostermiller.
If the sex offenders get prosecuted in state courts rather than federal courts, Ostermiller says the end result will be lighter sentences and a higher cost to taxpayers here in Montana.
Over the last year, 20 people have been charged with failing to register here in Montana. ..News Source.. by KPAX-TV
June 11, 2008
WV- Offender Law Examined
This is a very interesting case. Lawyers need to present issues such as this to protect RSOs from these subtle problems with these laws.
6-11-2008 West Virginia:
New law amendments enacted in 2006 regarding registration with the State Police for sexual offenders are causing close scrutiny of a New Martinsville man’s case.
In the Wetzel County Circuit Court trial on May 12, Judge John Madden presiding, Roger L. Shuman, 54, of 296 North State Route 2, Lot 95W, New Martinsville, was found guilty of failing to register as a sexual offender. Allowed to remain free on bond, Shuman returned on June 6 for post-trial motions.
Counsel for the defense John Anderson of the Public Defender Corp. moved for an acquittal, saying Shuman was found guilty of conduct not embraced in the indictment. According to Anderson, up until 2006 it had been the responsibility of the State Police to verify a correct address for sexual offenders who were court ordered to register for life, as in Shuman’s case, who was convicted of incest with a minor.
In 2006 the statute was amended and it became the responsibility of the offenders to keep the police informed as to their whereabouts. The problem in Wetzel court arose because there is a specific penalty stated for “knowingly failing to register” in West Virginia Code 15-12-08c. On a first offense that person “shall be fined not less than $250 dollars nor more than $10,000 dollars or confined in jail not more than one year, or both.” The amended statute 15-12-10 which deals with offenders being required to update their information even if there has been no change, as Anderson contended was Shuman’s situation, does not specifically state what penalty shall be imposed for failure to maintain address verification.
Therefore, Anderson argued, “Any defect in form of behavior (referring to Shuman’s alleged failed attempts to update registration), falls under the rubric of knowingly failing to register. . .It is very clear something has gone awry in the prosecution. . .He was convicted of conduct which was not a crime.”
Prosecutor Tim Haught argued that registration for sex offenders is on-going, and it is now the responsibility of the offender to maintain updated information. He also said, “It is clear there are a number of obligations,” and the penalty for failure to comply with those obligations is outlined in 15-12-08c. Haught said the amendment refers to the entire statute. Shuman’s violation is in 15-12-10, but the penalty is mentioned in the preceding law.
Further, Haught said, “The defendant already waived his right to challenge the indictment by going to trial. . .The state’s position is that the defendant elected to not oppose the indictment.” In essence, it was too late after Shuman had already gone to trial and had been found guilty to say there was something wrong with the wording of the indictment.
After verifying several points in the case, Judge Madden decided to examine the laws and amendments more closely. “I will take a look at it—it warrants my attention.” He also said he would at a later date issue an order on Anderson’s motion to acquit. Shuman’s bond is to continue until Madden issues an order on the matter; sentencing will not be scheduled until after the order is made. ..News Source.. by BRENDA DORSEY, Staff Writer
