Lee sex offender ordinance language deemed too vague by judges

Two issues are relevant:

1) If it takes a judge and a couple of lawyers to decide whether or not a person violated a law, then the person is innocent simply because laws are supposed to be written so that "a reasonable man/woman" can understand them; this one is not easily understood from how it is written;

2) There is no proof that "children regularly congregate" anywhere, their parents may take them to places (designed by adults to attract or lure children to come. i.e., schools, parks, playgrounds, etc.) but that is not proof that the children would do so of their own accord. No one can know the minds of children or be able to ascertain what they might do or not do, or what they wish to do. The phrase where "children regularly congregate" is the legislature trying to read the minds of children, like a lie detector trys to read a person's mind.

12-17-2009 Florida:

Portions of a child safety/sex offender ordinance passed in Lee County earlier this year have been deemed unconstitutional by two county judges in a ruling signed Monday.

The ordinance prohibits registered sex offenders from being within 300 feet of several places, including parks, restaurants, pools, schools, bus stops, playgrounds, zoos or any place children may congregate.

Two men have been arrested for violating the ordinance, and their Fort Myers attorneys — Pete Aiken and John Charles Coleman — had argued the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was too vague and too broad.

In a six-page ruling, Judges Radford Sturgis and John Duryea decided that while it wouldn’t dismiss the charges against the two men based on constitutionality because each had been arrested at a clearly-defined places — pools. Further, the judges said they wouldn’t rule based on hypothetical situations.

But, they did find that certain language contained in the ordinance was over-broad. Namely: “business or transient facility,” “permanent or stationary facilities,” “but is not limited to,” and “other similar type places where children congregate” or “regularly congregate.”

“The number and range of facilities already listed under those definitions is so diverse such as to make the added inclusive terms of ‘but not limited to’ and ‘other similar places’ over-broad and inclusive of innumerable locations which could potentially have a chilling effect on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights,” the judges wrote.

Therefore, those terms were stricken from the ordinance — but the ordinance still remains in place, and otherwise is considered constitutional, the judges decided.
Aiken, who represented Joseph Comfort, said while it was a disappointment for his client, whose 20-year-old offense was not related to children, the ruling is in some ways a victory.

“It’s a kind of a split the baby ruling,” Aiken said. “We won with regard to getting rid of some of the key language, but I can bring the issue up again with a different client to address some of the other vague, overly-broad language.”

Prosecutor Cameron Siggs had argued last month before the judges that sex offenders have forfeited certain rights, including an expectation of privacy and unfettered freedom of access.

The ordinance, written by a sheriff’s sergeant and promoted by Sheriff Mike Scott, was passed by county commissioners in March. ..Source.. Rachel Revehl